Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated holding company headquartered at 3555 Farnam Street, Omaha, Nebraska. Its origins trace to a textile manufacturing business founded in 1839, but the modern Berkshire was reshaped after Warren Buffett assumed control in 1965. Today it is one of the world’s largest diversified conglomerates, owning subsidiaries engaged in insurance and reinsurance, freight rail, utilities and energy, manufacturing (industrial, building and consumer products), service and retailing, and finance/leasing. It also holds one of the largest portfolios of marketable equity securities in the world.
Berkshire is managed on an unusually decentralized basis: operating subsidiaries run day-to-day businesses independently, while headquarters allocates capital, manages the investment portfolio, and oversees enterprise risk. The company reports in two broad groups—Insurance and Other and Railroad, Utilities and Energy—disaggregated into reportable segments including GEICO, Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group, Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, BNSF, BHE, Manufacturing, Service & Retailing, McLane and Pilot. This structure allows Berkshire to generate cash across economic cycles while maintaining exceptional liquidity.
Class A (BRK.A) and Class B (BRK.B) shares trade on the NYSE. Class B carries 1/1,500th of the economic rights and 1/10,000th of the voting rights of a Class A share. Berkshire does not pay a regular dividend but repurchases shares when the CEO, after consulting the Chairman, believes the price is below intrinsic value.
2. Executive Summary
Berkshire’s first nine months of 2026 were operationally strong: total revenues rose 8.6% to $301.1 billion**, and net earnings attributable to shareholders increased **21.2% to $57.9 billion. Underwriting at GEICO and BHRG, higher freight volumes at BNSF, earnings growth at BHE, and a double-digit increase in manufacturing/service/retailing profits drove the result. Investment gains—largely unrealized mark-to-market movements on the equity portfolio—contributed $20.9 billion after tax, though management cautions these are “often meaningless” for evaluating periodic operating performance.
The balance sheet remains exceptionally liquid: cash, cash equivalents and U.S. Treasury Bills within Insurance and Other stood at $373.2 billion** (net of unsettled purchases), and total shareholders’ equity reached **$763.6 billion. Berkshire completed two major acquisitions—OxyChem ($9.4 billion) and **Taylor Morrison Home Corporation** ($6.8 billion)—and repurchased $14.4 billion** of its own stock. Capital expenditures were **$16.1 billion, weighted toward BNSF and BHE.
Market context: As of November 11, 2026, BRK-B traded at $588.24**, near its period high, with a **period return of 18.39%** year-to-date versus **11.09%** for the S&P 500. Market capitalization stood at **$1.25 trillion. The stock’s trailing P/E of 16.46× is at the 100th percentile of its own history (historic average 14.63×), reflecting both improved operating earnings and the market’s willingness to pay a higher multiple for Berkshire’s cash-rich, low-leverage profile. The valuation score of 90.6/100 (lower multiples score higher) sits in stark contrast to the growth score of 0.0/100, capturing a structural tension: Berkshire is inexpensive relative to the market on some measures, but its earnings trajectory is decelerating from the extraordinary 2023–2024 peaks.
Key risks include the PacifiCorp wildfire litigation (cumulative probable-loss accrual of $2.85 billion, with the company warning of material additional losses); goodwill impairment sensitivity (four reporting units with less than a 20% fair-value cushion); and volatility from investment gains/losses, which can swing reported earnings sharply. The ROE of 10.57% trails the financials sector average of 21.76%, and ROIC of 8.98% trails the sector’s 20.72%, though Berkshire’s returns are structurally lower-risk and less leveraged than peers.
3. Comparative Financial Statements (9M 2026 vs. 9M 2025; Balance Sheet Sep-2026 vs. Dec-2025)
All figures in USD millions unless labelled “bn”. Percentage changes calculated on reported amounts. Source: Consolidated Statements of Earnings (10-Q p. 5), Consolidated Balance Sheets (10-Q pp. 3–4), Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (10-Q p. 8).
3.1 Income Statement (First Nine Months)
| Line item | 9M 2026 | 9M 2025 | Change % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | |||
| Insurance premiums earned | 66,915 | 66,444 | +0.7% |
| Sales and service revenues | 168,453 | 148,484 | +13.4% |
| Leasing revenues | 8,400 | 7,453 | +12.7% |
| Interest, dividend and other investment income | 16,798 | 17,331 | –3.1% |
| Railroad transportation revenues | 19,333 | 17,375 | +11.3% |
| Utilities and energy operating revenues | 17,801 | 16,658 | +6.9% |
| Service revenues and other income | 3,430 | 3,467 | –1.1% |
| Total revenues | 301,130 | 277,212 | +8.6% |
| Investment gains (losses) | 26,418 | 21,868 | +20.8% |
| Costs and expenses | |||
| Insurance losses and LAE | 43,317 | 42,454 | +2.0% |
| Life, annuity and health benefits | 3,377 | 3,316 | +1.8% |
| Insurance underwriting expenses | 14,093 | 13,255 | +6.3% |
| Cost of sales and services | 136,094 | 119,042 | +14.3% |
| Cost of leasing | 6,359 | 5,651 | +12.5% |
| Selling, general and administrative | 21,168 | 21,897 | –3.3% |
| Interest expense (Insurance & Other) | 972 | 983 | –1.1% |
| Railroad transportation expenses | 12,638 | 11,464 | +10.2% |
| Utilities and energy cost of sales and other | 13,240 | 12,825 | +3.2% |
| Other expenses | 3,142 | 3,113 | +0.9% |
| Interest expense (Railroad/Utilities) | 3,023 | 2,788 | +8.4% |
| Total costs and expenses | 257,423 | 236,788 | +8.7% |
| Earnings before income taxes and equity method earnings | 70,125 | 62,292 | +12.6% |
| Equity method earnings (losses) | 1,403 | (4,289) | n.m. |
| Earnings before income taxes | 71,528 | 58,003 | +23.3% |
| Income tax expense | 13,391 | 10,010 | +33.8% |
| Net earnings | 58,137 | 47,993 | +21.1% |
| Less: noncontrolling interests | 252 | 224 | +12.5% |
| Net earnings attributable to Berkshire | 57,885 | 47,769 | +21.2% |
| EPS – Class A equivalent | $40,377 | $33,214 | +21.6% |
| EPS – Class B equivalent | $26.92 | $22.14 | +21.6% |
Key observations: Revenue growth was broad-based, led by manufacturing/service/retailing (+13.4%) and railroad (+11.3%). Underwriting expenses grew faster than premiums earned (+6.3% vs. +0.7%), reflecting higher GEICO commissions and advertising and business-mix changes at BH Primary. Equity method earnings swung to a $1.4 billion profit** from a **$4.3 billion loss in 2025, the latter including a $5.0 billion Kraft Heinz impairment. The effective tax rate rose to 18.7% from 17.3%, mainly due to a higher mix of taxable pre-tax income and lower dividends-received-deduction benefits.
3.2 Balance Sheet
| Line item | Sep 30, 2026 | Dec 31, 2025 | Change % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assets | |||
| Cash and cash equivalents (Insurance & Other) | 36,034 | 47,719 | –24.5% |
| Short-term U.S. Treasury Bills | 336,735 | 321,434 | +4.8% |
| Investments in fixed maturity securities | 17,082 | 17,816 | –4.1% |
| Investments in equity securities | 335,515 | 297,778 | +12.7% |
| Equity method investments | 20,650 | 19,978 | +3.4% |
| Loans and finance receivables | 30,880 | 29,836 | +3.5% |
| Other receivables | 50,983 | 44,331 | +15.0% |
| Inventories | 35,098 | 24,424 | +43.7% |
| Property, plant and equipment (Insurance & Other) | 39,534 | 31,885 | +24.0% |
| Goodwill | 56,441 | 55,945 | +0.9% |
| Other intangible assets | 34,254 | 33,802 | +1.3% |
| Railroad, utilities and energy assets (net) | 254,471 | 246,176 | +3.4% |
| Total assets | 1,303,907 | 1,222,176 | +6.7% |
| Liabilities | |||
| Unpaid losses and LAE | 124,210 | 120,713 | +2.9% |
| Unpaid losses – retroactive reinsurance | 28,104 | 31,048 | –9.5% |
| Unearned insurance premiums | 33,808 | 31,339 | +7.9% |
| Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities | 65,556 | 57,269 | +14.5% |
| Notes payable and other borrowings (Insurance & Other) | 45,767 | 45,763 | +0.0% |
| Notes payable and other borrowings (Railroad/Utilities) | 85,016 | 83,318 | +2.0% |
| Income taxes, principally deferred | 92,322 | 86,955 | +6.2% |
| Total liabilities | 540,279 | 502,473 | +7.5% |
| Equity | |||
| Berkshire shareholders’ equity | 761,368 | 717,419 | +6.1% |
| Noncontrolling interests | 2,260 | 2,284 | –1.1% |
| Total equity | 763,628 | 719,703 | +6.1% |
Key observations: The 43.7% surge in inventories was largely acquisition-driven: real-estate inventory rose from $2.4 billion to $10.6 billion due to Taylor Morrison, with OxyChem also contributing. Goodwill rose modestly, but management flags that four reporting units had less than a 20% fair-value cushion at the 2025 annual impairment test. Debt remained broadly stable; Berkshire’s non-BHE/BNSF borrowings were $45.8 billion, while BHE and BNSF carried $85.0 billion. Equity increased by $43.9 billion, reflecting $57.9 billion of net earnings, partly offset by $14.4 billion of treasury-stock purchases and other comprehensive income movements.
3.3 Cash Flow Statement (First Nine Months)
| Line item | 9M 2026 | 9M 2025 | Change % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | 33,914 | 34,777 | –2.5% |
| Net cash from investing activities | (30,595) | (6,095) | n.m. |
| Net cash from financing activities | (14,137) | (278) | n.m. |
| Effect of FX on cash | (93) | 331 | n.m. |
| Net change in cash | (10,911) | 28,735 | n.m. |
| Cash at beginning of period | 52,569 | 48,376 | +8.7% |
| Cash at end of period | 41,658 | 77,111 | –46.0% |
Key observations: Operating cash flow was $33.9 billion**, slightly below 2025, primarily because of higher receivables and other asset build-ups, partly offset by higher earnings. Investing outflows ballooned to **$30.6 billion due to the OxyChem and TMHC acquisitions ($16.2 billion net of cash), higher equity purchases ($41.8 billion), and increased capex ($16.1 billion). Financing outflows of **$14.1 billion** were driven by $13.8 billion of treasury-stock repurchases; debt activity was roughly neutral.
4. Ratio Analysis
Berkshire’s balance sheet is unclassified (no current/non-current distinction), so traditional liquidity ratios such as the current ratio are not meaningful. Liquidity is instead assessed through cash and Treasury-bill holdings relative to liabilities and through the negative cost of float. Turnover ratios use average balances for the nine-month period and a 270-day period. Industry benchmarks are drawn from 2026 US sector data.
| Ratio | Formula | 9M 2026 | 9M 2025 / FY2025 | Change | US industry benchmark (source) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||||
| Net profit margin | Net earnings ÷ Revenue | 19.3% | 17.3% | +2.0 pp | S&P 500 median ~11–12% (Damodaran, 2026) |
| Pre-tax margin | Pre-tax earnings ÷ Revenue | 23.8% | 20.9% | +2.9 pp | Conglomerates ~10–15% |
| ROE (annualised) | Net earnings attributable ÷ avg. Berkshire equity | 10.4% | 9.1% (FY2025) | +1.3 pp | Financials sector avg. 21.76% (dashboard, Nov-2026) |
| ROA (annualised) | Net earnings ÷ avg. total assets | 6.1% | 5.4% (FY2025) | +0.7 pp | Financials sector avg. 4.58% |
| ROIC (annualised) | NOPAT ÷ invested capital | ~9.0% | — | — | Financials sector avg. 20.72% |
| Liquidity | |||||
| Cash + T-bills / total liabilities | (36,034 + 336,735) ÷ 540,279 | 69.0% | 73.5% (Dec-2025) | –4.5 pp | Insurance P&C current ratio median 0.4× |
| Efficiency | |||||
| Days sales outstanding (DSO) | Avg. receivables ÷ Revenue × 270 | 46.9 days | 44.1 days (9M 2025) | +2.8 days | Manufacturing DSO ~42 days (DuluthPath, 2026) |
| Days inventory outstanding (DIO) | Avg. inventory ÷ COGS × 270 | 59.0 days | 47.0 days (9M 2025) | +12.0 days | Manufacturing 36–73 days (BusCalcTools, 2026) |
| Days payables outstanding (DPO) | Avg. payables ÷ COGS × 270 | 121.8 days | 115.0 days (9M 2025) | +6.8 days | Manufacturing ~60–90 days |
| Cash conversion cycle (CCC) | DSO + DIO – DPO | –15.9 days | –23.8 days | +7.9 days | Negative CCC is a competitive advantage |
| Leverage & coverage | |||||
| Total debt / equity | (45,767 + 85,016) ÷ 763,628 | 17.1% | 17.5% (Dec-2025) | –0.4 pp | Utilities median 1.2×–2.1× |
| Total liabilities / equity | 540,279 ÷ 763,628 | 70.8% | 69.8% (Dec-2025) | +1.0 pp | S&P 500 median ~0.52× (QuantLink, Sep-2026) |
| Interest coverage (EBIT / interest) | (71,528 + 3,995) ÷ 3,995 | 18.9× | 17.6× (9M 2025) | +1.3× | P&C insurance ~1,102× (CSIMarket, Q2-2026) |
| Market / per-share | |||||
| NAV per Class A equivalent share | 761,368 ÷ 1.4189 m shares | $536,600 | $487,000 (Dec-2025) | +10.2% | — |
| NAV per Class B equivalent share | $536,600 ÷ 1,500 | $357.7 | $324.7 (Dec-2025) | +10.2% | — |
| Operating cash flow per Class B share | 33,914 ÷ 2,150.4 m equiv. B shares | $15.77 | $16.12 (9M 2025) | –2.2% | — |
Interpretation: Profitability is well above the broad US market and the insurance sector, reflecting disciplined underwriting and low-cost float. The negative cash conversion cycle (–15.9 days) means Berkshire is paid by customers before it pays many suppliers—a hallmark of its competitive moat. Leverage is conservative for a conglomerate, especially compared with regulated utilities, and interest coverage is exceptionally high. The rise in DIO (+12 days) is largely acquisition-driven (Taylor Morrison real-estate inventory) and should be monitored, but it remains within the normal manufacturing range.
Relative to the Financials sector (76 peers), Berkshire screens cheaper on P/E (16.46× vs. 22.85×, –27.96%), P/S (3.16× vs. 4.60×, –31.33%), and P/B (0.00× reported, reflecting the dashboard’s inability to compute a meaningful book multiple for a negative-cost-float conglomerate), but it also screens weaker on ROE (10.57% vs. 21.76%) and ROIC (8.98% vs. 20.72%). The apparent contradiction—cheap multiples, lower returns—is resolved by Berkshire’s lower leverage, massive liquidity, and insurance-float funding model, which structurally dampens ROE but reduces tail risk.
5. Market Dashboard Analysis
The Capital Insight BD dashboard provides a market-facing complement to the fundamental 10-Q analysis. The period studied is January 1, 2026 to November 11, 2026 (216 trading days).
5.1 Price, Volatility and Relative Performance
BRK-B closed at $588.24** on November 11, 2026, essentially at its **period high of $588.51 (also November 11). The period low was $464.34 (May 5, 2026). The period return was 18.39%, annualizing to 21.77%, versus the S&P 500’s 11.09% total return (13.00% annualized). Berkshire outperformed the index by 7.30 percentage points over the period.
| Metric | BRK-B | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| Period total return | 18.39% | 11.09% |
| Annualized return | 21.77% | 13.00% |
| Annualized volatility | 15.35% | 14.01% |
| Correlation with index | 0.080 | 1.00 |
| Daily win rate | 50.93% | — |
| Average volume (shares) | 4,548,884 | — |
| Market capitalization | $1,249.73 bn | — |
The near-zero correlation (0.080) with the S&P 500 is a defining characteristic: Berkshire’s returns have been driven by idiosyncratic factors—operating earnings, investment gains, and capital-allocation decisions—rather than broad market beta. For portfolio construction, this low correlation is a diversification benefit, even though Berkshire’s volatility (15.35%) is only marginally higher than the index’s (14.01%). The win rate of 50.93% indicates that positive returns were not concentrated in a few outlier days; the outperformance was relatively consistent.
5.2 Valuation Metrics and Score Interpretation
| Metric | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| P/E (trailing) | 16.46× | 100th percentile of own history; historic average 14.63× |
| Forward P/E | 26.18× | Based on next-twelve-month consensus EPS |
| P/S | 3.16× | Below financials sector average of 4.60× |
| P/B | 0.00× (not meaningful) | Dashboard limitation for negative-cost-float conglomerates |
| PEG | — (not meaningful) | Earnings base distorted by investment gains |
| EV/EBITDA, EV/Revenue | — (not meaningful) | Berkshire does not report EBITDA conventionally |
Composite scores:
| Score | Value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Valuation score | 90.6 / 100 | High score = lower multiples relative to the scoring universe |
| Quality score | 21.1 / 100 | Low score = weaker ROE/ROA/margin composite versus peers |
| Growth score | 0.0 / 100 | Lowest possible score = negative or decelerating EPS trend |
| Composite score | 37.2 / 100 | Blended attractiveness: cheap on valuation, weak on quality and growth |
The P/E of 16.46× sits at the 100th percentile of Berkshire’s own history, meaning the stock has rarely been this expensive on trailing earnings. However, the valuation score of 90.6 suggests that relative to the scoring universe (likely S&P 500 constituents), Berkshire still screens cheap. The quality score of 21.1 and growth score of 0.0 capture the fundamental tension: Berkshire’s ROE and margins trail the high-growth, high-return financials that dominate the index, and its EPS is in a downtrend (–24.78% annual YoY in FY2025; –27.60% quarterly YoY in Q3 2026). The forward P/E of 26.18× implies the market expects earnings to decline over the next twelve months, consistent with the growth score.
Caution on the P/E percentile: The 100th-percentile reading is partly mechanical. Berkshire’s trailing EPS includes large unrealized investment gains that inflate the denominator in strong markets and depress it in weak markets. The 16.46× trailing P/E is therefore not comparable to an operating-company P/E. Management explicitly states that investment gains/losses have “little analytical or predictive value.” A more appropriate lens is price-to-operating-earnings or price-to-book, but the dashboard’s P/B is not meaningful. Investors should treat the 100th-percentile P/E as a sentiment signal (the market is paying up for Berkshire’s cash and quality) rather than a precise valuation verdict.
5.3 Profitability Trends (Dashboard Data)
| Metric | Value | Trend |
|---|---|---|
| ROE | 10.57% | ▲ +1.40% |
| ROA | 5.20% | ▲ +0.65% |
| ROIC | 8.98% | — |
| Gross margin | 26.60% | — |
| Operating margin | 26.60% | — |
The dashboard’s ROE and ROA are broadly consistent with the 10-Q-derived annualized ratios (10.4% and 6.1%, respectively), with minor differences arising from averaging conventions and the treatment of noncontrolling interests. The gross margin and operating margin are both reported as 26.60%, which is a dashboard simplification: Berkshire does not report a conventional gross margin, and the identity of the two figures suggests the dashboard is using a single consolidated revenue-less-cost-of-sales line. This should not be interpreted as a segment-level margin. The 26.60% figure is lower than the financials sector average gross margin of 42.04%, reflecting Berkshire’s large low-margin distribution and manufacturing businesses (McLane, Pilot, Marmon, etc.), which dilute the high-margin insurance and railroad operations.
5.4 Growth Metrics and EPS History
| Metric | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Latest annual EPS | $31.04 | FY2025 |
| Annual EPS YoY growth | –24.78% | vs. $41.27 in FY2024 |
| Latest reported quarterly EPS | $10.33 | Q3 FY2026 (Sep-30-2026) |
| Quarterly EPS YoY growth | –27.60% | vs. $14.28 in Q3 FY2025 |
| Latest reported quarterly net income | $22,112 mn | Q3 FY2026 |
| FY2025 annual net income | $66,968 mn | FY2025 |
The EPS decline is real but largely optical. FY2025 EPS of $31.04 was **down 24.78%** from FY2024’s $41.27, and Q3 2026 EPS of $10.33 was **down 27.60%** year over year. However, the prior-year comparatives were inflated by **large investment gains**: Q3 2025 included **$21.9 billion of pre-tax investment gains**, versus $11.9 billion in Q3 2026. On an operating basis (excluding investment gains), the trend is more stable. The dashboard’s growth score of 0.0 is therefore directionally correct on reported EPS but overstates the fundamental deterioration in Berkshire’s operating businesses, which grew pre-tax earnings by 12.6% in 9M 2026.
The reported financial history in the dashboard reveals the volatility of Berkshire’s earnings base:
| Period End | EPS | EPS Growth | Net Income (Mn) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-30 (Q3) | 10.33 | –27.60% | 22,112 |
| 2026-06-30 (Q2) | 11.91 | +107.74% | 25,667 |
| 2026-03-31 (Q1) | 4.68 | +119.60% | 10,106 |
| 2025-12-31 (FY) | 31.04 | –24.78% | 66,968 |
| 2024-12-31 (FY) | 41.27 | –6.79% | 88,995 |
| 2023-12-31 (FY) | 44.27 | +528.63% | 96,223 |
| 2022-12-31 (FY) | –10.33 | — | –22,759 |
The 2022 loss and the 2023 rebound illustrate the outsized role of investment marks. Any growth-score or EPS-trend metric that does not adjust for investment gains will be structurally misleading for Berkshire.
5.5 Shareholding Structure
Berkshire’s ownership is dominated by passive institutional index funds, with insiders holding a negligible economic stake (though Warren Buffett’s Class A voting power is structurally significant).
| Category | Top-10 Shares | Top-10 Value | % Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional | 462,533,884 | $264.06 bn | 21.54% |
| Mutual funds | 223,018,913 | $127.32 bn | 10.38% |
| Insiders | 74,126 | $36.9 mn | 0.00% |
Largest institutional holders:
| Holder | Shares | % Held |
|---|---|---|
| BlackRock | 121,183,112 | 5.64% |
| Vanguard Capital Management | 118,360,180 | 5.51% |
| State Street | 75,747,788 | 3.53% |
| Geode Capital | 41,525,290 | 1.93% |
| Morgan Stanley | 26,667,029 | 1.24% |
| Gates Foundation Trust | 14,689,844 | 0.68% |
Largest mutual-fund holders are all S&P 500 index funds: Vanguard Total Stock Market Index (2.66%), Vanguard 500 Index (2.21%), iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (1.16%), Fidelity 500 Index (1.13%), and SPDR S&P 500 ETF (1.07%). The presence of these index funds is a double-edged sword: it provides a stable, price-insensitive shareholder base, but it also means Berkshire’s stock is subject to index-inclusion flows and rebalancing rather than purely fundamental demand. The Gates Foundation Trust’s 0.68% stake is a legacy holding that has been gradually reduced over time; further sales could create periodic supply overhangs, though the trust has not signaled an accelerated disposition.
The insider ownership of ~0.00% (excluding Buffett’s Class A shares, which are not aggregated in the Class B-equivalent table) underscores Berkshire’s unusual governance: managers of subsidiaries own operating businesses, but Berkshire-level insiders own very little of the parent. Alignment comes through culture and compensation, not equity ownership—a structure that has worked for decades but is a governance consideration for new shareholders who prefer skin-in-the-game.
6. Opportunities and Threats (Investor Perspective)
Opportunities
1. Insurance float at negative cost. Float reached $178.5 billion at September 30, 2026, and the combined insurance operations generated pre-tax underwriting earnings. Berkshire is paid to hold float, a structural advantage that funds investments at a negative cost of capital. As long as underwriting remains profitable, this is a self-reinforcing engine.
2. Capital deployment firepower. Cash and T-bills of $373 billion** (Insurance and Other, net of unsettled purchases) provide ample dry powder for large acquisitions, share repurchases, or opportunistic investments during dislocations. The **$14.4 billion of buybacks in 9M 2026 demonstrate that management is willing to deploy capital when it views the stock as undervalued.
3. BNSF volume and pricing momentum. Railroad revenues rose 11.3%, with carloads up 4.2% and average revenue per car up 7.1%. Management cited higher West Coast imports, tightening truck capacity, and strong grain/petroleum shipments. If the US industrial economy holds up, BNSF should continue to leverage its network.
4. BHE’s regulated and renewable asset base. U.S. utilities saw retail volumes rise 5.5% and electric margin grow 8.2%. Production tax credits from wind generation materially reduce BHE’s effective tax rate (a –55.1% effective tax rate in 9M 2026). The pending sale of PacifiCorp’s Washington operations for $1.9 billion simplifies the portfolio.
5. Manufacturing and service scale. Manufacturing pre-tax earnings rose 15.6%, driven by aerospace demand at PCC, pricing at Lubrizol, and OxyChem consolidation. TTI and aviation services (NetJets, FlightSafety) are compounding at double-digit rates.
6. Low correlation and diversification. The 0.080 correlation with the S&P 500 makes Berkshire a genuine portfolio diversifier. In a market where mega-cap technology concentration is elevated, Berkshire’s idiosyncratic return profile is valuable.
Threats
1. PacifiCorp wildfire litigation. The cumulative probable-loss accrual is $2.85 billion**, but PacifiCorp has already paid **$2.3 billion and warns that “it is reasonably possible [it] will incur material additional losses beyond the amounts accrued.” The Oregon Supreme Court is reviewing the Phase I verdict, and a ruling against PacifiCorp could be financially significant. This is the single largest identifiable contingent liability in the 10-Q.
2. Goodwill impairment risk. Four reporting units had fair-value cushions below 20% at the 2025 annual test, with aggregate goodwill of **$9.2 billion**. Adverse changes in market conditions or cash-flow forecasts could trigger impairment charges. While $9.2 billion is only ~1.2% of equity, an impairment would be a negative sentiment event and could signal deeper problems in the affected units.
3. Volatility from investment gains/losses. Unrealized equity gains/losses contributed $24.5 billion pre-tax in 9M 2026, but these can reverse sharply. The 27.60% YoY decline in Q3 EPS was largely driven by lower investment gains versus the prior-year period. Management says these gains have “little analytical or predictive value,” yet they dominate reported earnings and can distort valuation multiples.
4. Regulatory and rate risk at BHE and BNSF. BHE’s rates are subject to regulatory approval; disallowances of costs could hurt earnings. BNSF faces ongoing litigation and casualty expenses, and its fuel costs are sensitive to energy prices.
5. Concentration in top equity holdings. The five largest equity holdings represent 65% of the equity portfolio’s fair value (Alphabet, American Express, Apple, Bank of America, Coca-Cola). A sharp decline in any one of these could materially affect book value and reported earnings. This is a concentrated, high-quality portfolio, but it is not diversified across hundreds of names.
6. Valuation near historic highs. The trailing P/E of 16.46× is at the 100th percentile of Berkshire’s history, and the stock is trading near its period high of $588.51. While the absolute multiple is not extreme for the market, it is expensive relative to Berkshire’s own trading history. New shareholders are paying a higher price for the same operating earnings than they would have at most points in the past decade.
7. Audit Objections, Observations and Internal Controls
The 10-Q is unaudited and does not contain an auditor’s opinion. However, management’s Controls and Procedures section (Item 4, p. 51) states that the CEO and CFO concluded disclosure controls and procedures were effective, and there were no significant changes in internal control during the quarter. The certifying officers (Gregory E. Abel, CEO, and Charles C. Chang, CFO) signed the Section 302 and 906 certifications without qualification.
No “audit objections” or “observations” are disclosed. The only accounting-related flags are:
- Critical accounting estimates (p. 50): unpaid losses and LAE of $152.3 billion, where “a small percentage change … can result in a material effect on periodic earnings.”
- Goodwill impairment sensitivity (p. 51): four reporting units with less-than-20% cushions.
- New accounting pronouncement ASU 2024-03 on income-statement expense disaggregation, effective for annual periods after December 15, 2026, which Berkshire is evaluating.
There are no going-concern qualifications, no material weaknesses, and no restatements indicated. For a company of Berkshire’s complexity, the absence of control flags is a positive governance signal, though the unaudited nature of the 10-Q means investors should await the FY2026 10-K for the auditor’s formal opinion.
8. Litigation and Probable Impact (What-If Analysis)
8.1 PacifiCorp Wildfires (Note 22, pp. 24–27)
Current position:
- Cumulative probable-loss accrual: $2.85 billion through September 30, 2026.
- Paid to date: $2.3 billion**; unpaid accrual: **$566 million.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the Phase I verdict in April 2026 due to an erroneous jury instruction, but the Oregon Supreme Court has accepted review and heard oral argument on November 3, 2026.
- PacifiCorp has posted $719 million of bonds for 129 plaintiffs but has moved to discharge them following the appellate reversal.
- Management explicitly states it cannot reasonably estimate a specific range of additional losses and that additional losses could have a material adverse effect on PacifiCorp’s liquidity and financial condition.
What-if analysis: Assume an additional $1.0 billion** in ultimate wildfire losses (net of insurance and before tax). Using Berkshire’s 9M 2026 effective tax rate of ~18.7%, the after-tax impact would be **$813 million. On 2.15 billion equivalent Class B shares, the EPS hit would be $0.38 per B share** (or **$570 per Class A share). If the additional loss were $2.0 billion**, the EPS hit would double to **$0.76 per B share.
Relative to 9M 2026 EPS of **$26.92 per B share**, a $0.38–$0.76 headwind is 1.4%–2.8% of annualized EPS—manageable but not trivial. The bigger risk is reputational and regulatory: Oregon policymakers may pressure PacifiCorp’s cost recovery, which could affect long-term returns at BHE. A severe adverse ruling could also trigger credit-rating scrutiny at PacifiCorp, though Berkshire’s consolidated liquidity is a buffer.
8.2 HomeServices Antitrust (Burnett Case)
- A $250 million settlement** was reached in April 2024, payable over four years; **$130 million has been paid into escrow.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed final approval of all settlements in August 2026, and the mandate issued in October 2026. A petition to the Supreme Court is possible but discretionary.
- Probable impact: The remaining $120 million is already accrued or will be paid over time; no material EPS shock expected.
8.3 NICO Bankruptcy Settlement
- NICO agreed to pay $535 million to a bankruptcy estate and entered a proposed environmental consent decree (CDESA). The court approved both on October 22, 2026, subject to appeal.
- Probable impact: $535 million is roughly 0.2% of annual net earnings; not material to EPS, but the environmental liabilities could carry long-tail costs.
9. Future Earnings Impact (What-If Scenarios)
| Scenario | Trigger | Estimated EPS impact (Class B, annualised) | Qualitative probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base case | No additional wildfire losses; investment gains normalise | $23–$26 | Moderate |
| Adverse wildfire outcome | Oregon Supreme Court reinstates Phase I; additional $1.5 bn loss | –$0.57 | Low–moderate |
| Goodwill impairment | 10% write-down of the $9.2 bn at-risk goodwill | –$0.39 (after tax) | Low |
| Equity market decline | 20% drop in top-five holdings | –$30 bn pre-tax book-value hit; EPS impact depends on realised gains/losses | Market-dependent |
| BHE regulatory disallowance | $500 mn of costs disallowed | –$0.19 | Low |
The most credible near-term earnings driver is the trajectory of investment gains/losses, which are impossible to forecast. Management’s focus on operating earnings (underwriting, BNSF, BHE, manufacturing) is the correct lens: those segments are growing at a healthy clip, and the negative cost of float remains a powerful tailwind. New shareholders should underwrite Berkshire on operating earnings and book value, not on reported EPS, which will remain volatile.
10. Related Party Transactions
Berkshire does not disclose extensive external related-party dealings in the 10-Q, but the following are noteworthy:
- Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (50% owned): Berkshire’s insurance subsidiary provides a surety policy supporting Berkadia’s $1.5 billion commercial-paper capacity; Jefferies indemnifies Berkshire for half of any losses. This is a contingent obligation, not a direct related-party receivable/payable.
- Noncontrolling interests: Berkshire engages in “transactions with noncontrolling interests” (acquisitions of common stock, ownership adjustments). In 9M 2026 these were minor (–$76 million in equity, per the Statement of Changes in Shareholders’ Equity, p. 7).
- Loans to affiliates: The Homebuilding segment funds manufactured-home loans through borrowings from Berkshire finance affiliates. Interest income on these intercompany loans is eliminated in consolidation but appears in the “Other” earnings section. This is an internal capital-allocation mechanism, not an external related-party risk.
- No material related-party revenue or expense is separately disclosed.
Risk/opportunity: The Berkadia surety arrangement exposes Berkshire to contingent credit risk if the commercial mortgage market deteriorates, but the Jefferies indemnity halves that exposure. Otherwise, related-party activity is low-risk.
11. Investment in Other Company Shares
Berkshire’s equity portfolio is one of the largest in the world. At September 30, 2026, investments in equity securities (excluding equity-method holdings) had a fair value of $335.5 billion** (cost basis **$108.5 billion), producing $227.1 billion of unrealised gains.
Top five holdings (65% of portfolio fair value): Alphabet Inc., American Express Company, Apple Inc., Bank of America Corporation, and The Coca-Cola Company. Berkshire does not disclose the exact fair value of each holding in the 10-Q, but states they represent 65% of the aggregate fair value of the equity securities portfolio as of September 30, 2026 (Note 4, p. 11).
Equity-method investments (Note 5, pp. 12–13):
| Company | Ownership | Carrying value (Sep-2026) | Fair value (Sep-2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kraft Heinz | 27.5% | $8.831 bn | $7.398 bn |
| Occidental Petroleum | 26.5% | $11.359 bn | $14.657 bn |
| Berkadia | 50% | $0.460 bn | n/a |
Key points: Kraft Heinz is carried above fair value ($8.8 billion vs. $7.4 billion), but Berkshire concluded no impairment was required at September 30, 2026. A previous $5.0 billion impairment** was taken in Q2 2025. Further declines could trigger another charge. **Occidental** preferred stock (**$8.5 billion liquidation value, 8% dividend) and warrants are also held at fair value. The concentration risk is real: a 20% decline in the top-five holdings would reduce book value by roughly $43 billion pre-tax, though unrealised gains would absorb much of the hit.
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Read Pulse →12. Other Important Issues
- Share repurchases: Berkshire bought back $14.4 billion** of stock in 9M 2026, including **$9.6 billion in Q3 alone. The programme has no expiry and no maximum, but repurchases stop if consolidated cash + T-bills fall below $30 billion. This is a signal that management views the stock as undervalued relative to intrinsic value, even with the P/E near a historic high.
- Debt maturity profile: Berkshire’s debt is long-dated and mostly fixed-rate. In April 2026 it issued ¥272.3 billion ($1.7 billion) of yen-denominated senior notes at a weighted average rate of 2.4%, taking advantage of low Japanese rates. BHE and BNSF debt is non-recourse to Berkshire.
- Regulatory capital: BHE and BNSF are in compliance with all debt covenants. Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries remain strongly capitalised.
- Taxes: The OECD Pillar Two global minimum tax is not expected to have a material effect, according to management (Note 19, p. 23).
- Mine safety: Exhibit 95 discloses no significant violations or patterns of non-compliance at PacifiCorp or Acme Brick mining facilities.
13. Nine-Month Performance at a Glance (9M 2026 vs. 9M 2025)
| Metric | 9M 2026 | 9M 2025 | Change % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $301.1 bn | $277.2 bn | +8.6% |
| Gross profit (Revenue – cost of sales & services) | $165.0 bn | $158.2 bn | +4.3% |
| Operating profit (Pre-tax earnings before equity method) | $70.1 bn | $62.3 bn | +12.6% |
| Net income attributable to Berkshire | $57.9 bn | $47.8 bn | +21.2% |
| EPS – Class A equivalent | $40,377 | $33,214 | +21.6% |
| EPS – Class B equivalent (diluted) | $26.92 | $22.14 | +21.6% |
| NAV per Class A share | $536,600 | $487,000 (Dec-2025) | +10.2% |
| NAV per Class B share | $357.7 | $324.7 (Dec-2025) | +10.2% |
| Net operating cash flow per Class B share | $15.77 | $16.12 | –2.2% |
| Total assets | $1,303.9 bn | $1,222.2 bn (Dec-2025) | +6.7% |
| Total equity | $763.6 bn | $719.7 bn (Dec-2025) | +6.1% |
Note: Gross profit is approximated as total revenues less “Cost of sales and services”; this excludes insurance losses and other segment-specific costs, so it is not a GAAP gross margin. NAV per share uses period-end equity and equivalent shares outstanding.
14. Q4 2026 and FY2026 Projections: Bear, Base and Bull Cases
The following projections are model-derived scenarios, anchored to 9M 2026 actuals from the 10-Q and cross-checked against publicly available analyst consensus. They are not company guidance and should be treated as illustrative frameworks, not forecasts.
14.1 Methodology and Consensus Anchors
9M 2026 actuals: Revenue $301.13 billion**; net earnings attributable to Berkshire **$57.885 billion; diluted Class B EPS $26.92.
Q4 2026 consensus (Yahoo Finance, 1 analyst): Revenue $104.02 billion**; EPS **$5.73. Backpack Securities consensus (2 analysts): Revenue $99.86 billion**; EPS **$7,962.20 per Class A (≈ $5.31 per Class B**). **Traders Union:** Revenue **~$100.1 billion; EPS $5.35.
FY2026 consensus range (multiple sources):
| Source | Revenue estimate | EPS estimate (Class B) |
|---|---|---|
| Yahoo Finance (1 analyst) | $418.31 bn | $23.25 |
| FactSet (5 analysts, median) | — | **$22.29** (range $21.22–$23.25) |
| Globe and Mail (consensus) | — | $20.87 |
| TipRanks (Nov-2026) | — | ~$22.47 |
| StockAnalysis (1 analyst) | $391.81 bn | **$21.76** (derived from Class A $32,644.77 ÷ 1,500) |
| MarketScreener | $375.48 bn | Net income $48.65 bn |
The dispersion reflects different treatments of investment gains/losses and the small number of analysts covering Berkshire (1–5, versus dozens for a typical S&P 500 company). The median FY2026 EPS consensus is roughly $22.29**, but estimates range from **$20.87 to $23.25.
14.2 Scenario Assumptions
Bear case: Investment gains reverse modestly in Q4 (equity markets flat-to-down); GEICO loss ratio remains elevated; BNSF fuel costs stay high; no additional wildfire reserve but PacifiCorp overhang weighs on sentiment. Q4 revenue roughly in line with the lower end of consensus; FY2026 EPS at the bottom of the consensus range.
Base case: Q4 investment gains positive but below Q3’s elevated level; operating earnings grow mid-single-digit; BNSF and BHE perform in line with 9M trends; no major catastrophe or litigation shock. Q4 in line with consensus midpoint; FY2026 EPS near the median consensus.
Bull case: Equity markets rally into year-end, producing another quarter of strong investment gains; GEICO margins improve sequentially; BNSF volumes accelerate; BHE benefits from favorable regulatory outcomes; OxyChem and Taylor Morrison contribute ahead of plan. Q4 above the high end of consensus; FY2026 EPS at or above the top of the consensus range.
14.3 Projection Table
| Bear case | Base case | Bull case | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 2026 revenue | $98 bn | $102 bn | $106 bn |
| Q4 2026 net income | $8.5 bn | $10.5 bn | $12.5 bn |
| Q4 2026 diluted EPS (Class B) | $3.95 | $4.88 | $5.81 |
| FY2026 revenue | $399 bn | $403 bn | $407 bn |
| FY2026 net income | $66.4 bn | $68.4 bn | $70.4 bn |
| FY2026 diluted EPS (Class B) | $30.88 | $31.81 | $32.74 |
| FY2026 EPS vs. FY2025 ($31.04) | –0.5% | +2.5% | +5.5% |
| 12-month target price (Class B) | $520 | $588 | $640 |
| Target price basis | 16.8× bear EPS | 18.5× base EPS | 19.5× bull EPS |
Reconciliation to 9M actuals: 9M net income was **$57.885 billion**. Adding Q4 net income of $8.5 billion (bear), $10.5 billion (base), or $12.5 billion (bull) yields FY2026 net income of $66.4 billion, $68.4 billion, or $70.4 billion**, respectively. On **2.15 billion equivalent Class B shares**, this translates to FY2026 EPS of **$30.88, $31.81, or $32.74.
Why the base-case EPS ($31.81) is above the consensus median ($22.29): The consensus figures likely assume lower investment gains in Q4 or use a different share count. Our base case assumes Q4 investment gains of roughly $3–$4 billion pre-tax, consistent with a flat-to-modestly-up equity market, and uses the 2.15 billion equivalent Class B share count from the 10-Q. The consensus range is wide precisely because of this investment-gain uncertainty. Investors should treat the operating-earnings trajectory (which is more stable) as the primary signal and the reported EPS as a volatile residual.
Target price rationale: The base-case target of $588** is essentially the current price (as of November 11, 2026), implying **no upside** on a 12-month view if earnings land in line. This is consistent with the **forward P/E of 26.18×** and the **growth score of 0.0**: the market is already pricing in Berkshire’s quality and liquidity. The **bear case ($520) reflects a modest de-rating to 16.8× bear EPS, while the bull case ($640)** assumes both higher earnings and a slightly higher multiple (19.5×). The **analyst consensus target range is $510–$628** (StockAnalysis, 4 analysts; TipRanks average **$572, high $604), which brackets our scenarios.
14.4 Third-Party Analyst Views (Separate Reference)
| Source | Rating / Target | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| UBS (Oct-2026) | Buy, $628 | Highest target in the StockAnalysis poll; implies ~6.8% upside from $588 |
| DBS (Aug-2026) | Hold, $540 | Cautious on valuation; implies ~8.2% downside |
| Argus Research (Jun-2026) | Buy, n/a | Positive on long-term compounding |
| TipRanks consensus (Nov-2026) | Moderate Buy, $572 avg | 2 Buy, 1 Hold; range $540–$604 |
| StockAnalysis consensus (S&P Global) | Buy, $555.67 avg | 4 analysts; range $510–$628 |
| MarketBeat (Oct-2026) | Sell / Hold-leaning, $554.50 avg | 3 analysts; highest $628 |
The divergence between “Buy” consensus ratings and targets below the current price is a classic Berkshire dynamic: analysts respect the franchise but struggle to justify upside when the stock has already run. The median target of ~$555–$572 suggests limited near-term multiple expansion, and the forward P/E of 26.18× already discounts a earnings decline. New shareholders should be prepared for modest absolute returns unless operating earnings surprise to the upside or a large capital deployment event occurs.
15. Data Sources
Primary filings: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2026 (SEC filing, November 7, 2026). All 10-Q page references in this report correspond to this document.
Market and dashboard data: Capital Insight BD S&P 500 Stock Analysis Master Dashboard (period: January 1–November 11, 2026). Includes price, volatility, correlation, composite scores, valuation metrics, shareholding data, and reported financial history. The dashboard sources underlying market data from third-party feeds; specific fields such as forward P/E, PEG ratio, and some composite scores are derived from Yfinance and/or the dashboard’s internal scoring methodology, and are cited as such where used.
Analyst consensus and projections: Yahoo Finance (BRK-B Analysis), StockAnalysis.com (S&P Global poll), TipRanks, MarketBeat, FactSet via 鉅亨網, Globe and Mail, MarketScreener, Simply Wall St, Backpack Securities, Traders Union, and MetaTrader earnings preview. These sources are referenced in the projection section; their estimates are third-party opinions, not company guidance.
Industry benchmarks: Damodaran (S&P 500 margins, 2026), Zacks (industry ROE, Aug-2026), CSIMarket (insurance interest coverage, Q2-2026), DuluthPath (manufacturing DSO, 2026), BusCalcTools (manufacturing DIO, 2026), QuantLink (S&P 500 leverage, Sep-2026). These benchmarks are used for ratio comparison and are identified at the point of use.
Note on figures: All large figures are converted to USD billions where appropriate. 10-Q figures are in USD millions unless otherwise stated. Percentage changes are calculated on reported amounts and may differ slightly from company-disclosed percentages due to rounding.
16. Disclaimer
This report is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer to buy or sell any security, or a solicitation of any investment decision. The analysis is based on the attached Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2026, the Capital Insight BD dashboard, and publicly available third-party data. Projections and scenario analyses are model-derived estimates, not guarantees. Analyst consensus figures are third-party opinions and may be based on small sample sizes (1–5 analysts). While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, figures are subject to revision and may not reflect subsequent events. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult a qualified financial adviser before making any investment decisions. The author and CapitalinsightBD accept no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this report.
Prepared by:
Md Kollol Hossain
CEO, CapitalinsightBD
info@capitalinsightbd.com
